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Abstract 
According to Samia Mehrez (1991: 255), a complete decolonisation process must           
include both the colonised and colonising societies. For the colonisers, decolonisation           
entails liberation from the hegemonic system of thought and from ‘imperialist, racist            
perceptions, representations, and institutions’. Rooted in the conceptualisation of Israel          
as a settler colonial project, this paper aims to shed light on decolonisation attempts              
from within the (colonising) Israeli society. Here, resistance practices of groups of            
Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists, in active support of the Palestinian struggle, entail a           
confrontation with the state but at the same time include another, long-term dimension:             
the formation of discourse and practice that challenge the Zionist consensus which thus             
function as an educative practice. This article aims to shed light on these activities and               
to conceptualise them as acts of ‘critical pedagogy’. Indeed, their resistance teaches the             
Jewish-Israelis firstly about the reality of the oppression that Palestinians suffer.           
Secondly, and crucially, it reveals to the Jewish-Israelis the boundaries of permitted            
political activity and the possibility of overlooking and disregarding social conventions           
and legal norms. Most importantly, this type of activity (that is largely Palestinian-led             
and directed), symbolises the struggle against the boundaries and borders imposed by            
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the state, aimed at separating Israelis from Palestinians and thus it constitutes a             
counter-hegemonic praxis.  
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Introduction 
On 26 December 2003, the Israeli army shot, injuring two, unarmed demonstrators            
protesting against the construction of the wall Israel was building around the West Bank              
village of Masha. While similar incidents in which Palestinian inhabitants of the            
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) are injured often go unnoticed in the media, this             
particular incident attracted media interest in Israel and internationally, since one of the             
injured demonstrators happened to be Gil Na’amati, a Jewish-Israeli activist.​1 All           
reports mentioned the involvement of a group named ‘Anarchists Against The Wall’            
(AATW) in the demonstration, but did not expand much on its identity, ideology or              
patterns of activity.  
Writing in response to this same incident, Meron Benvenisti (2004), an Israeli            
essayist and historian, pointed to the uniqueness of this group. According to him, the              
demonstration was not aimed against the wall alone, but represents an ideological            
rebellion against the Israeli state and the sanctity of its laws: 
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There is no need to overestimate the importance of this group, which represents a              
marginal left-wing stream, with almost no influence. But one should also not            
underestimate the ideological and intellectual challenge that anarchists set before a           
society that attributes to the ‘Jewish State’ an absolute, sacred value, and worships             
‘laws’ as though they embody, by their very legislation, supreme moral and social             
values. There is no democratic state in the world in which statism and submission              
to the law are the main principles of faith, as they are in Israel. […] 
After two generation of occupation, the precarious basis of the legality of the             
occupation power has been forgotten, and everyone takes the ‘legality’ or           
illegality […] seriously. So it won’t hurt to have a little bit of anarchy, that shouts                
out: ‘the emperor is naked.’ 
 
In order to comprehend Benvenishti’s critique, and to better understand the role of the              
AATW and other anti-Zionist activists within Israeli society, some reflections about the            
Israeli regime and Jewish-Israeli society are called for.  
Following the rich literature on the historical development and the contemporary           
realities of the Zionist project and the Israeli state, Zionism is understood as a settler               
colonial movement, and accordingly, Israel as a settler colonial state (Salamanca et al.,             
2012; Shafir, 1989; Shafir and Peled, 2002; Weizman, 2013). In Israel, the (Jewish)             
ethno-national ideas of a community operate within a framework of liberal democratic            
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institutions. Indeed Israel defines itself as a ‘Jewish and democratic’ state and most             
Israeli Jews perceive themselves as living in a liberal democracy, and that the colonial              
and the religious-ethnic (Jewish) components at the basis of the regime do not negate              
the democratic character of the state. In fact, in Israel, nationalism is perceived as an               
essential component of the democratic regime (Azoulay and Ophir, 2012; Ram, 2011).            
Importantly, this is also how the majority of the international community perceives it.  
The Zionist principle of Israel as a ‘Jewish and democratic’ state lays the             
foundation for the definition of the polity, its public culture, policies and the scope of               
protection of constitutional rights (Masri, 2013). Following the rich theoretical literature           
that conceptualises and problematises the concept of ‘hegemony’, and focuses on the            
delicate balance between consent and coercion in the creation of the people’s ‘common             
sense’ (Anderson, 1976; Fontana, 2006; Gramsci, 1971, 1988; Lears, 1985; Mouffe,           
1979), this paper treats Zionism, embodied in the idea that Israel is, and should remain,               
a Jewish and democratic state, as hegemonic amongst the Jewish-Israeli citizens.  
Various apparatuses of the state play a fundamental role in structuring the nation             
as an ethnic group, as a historical narrative and political partnership. National identity             
and collective memory are structured and rooted in the ideological, bureaucratic and            
military spheres, in schools and households, in the work-place and in the army, thus              
becoming firmly established in the subjectivity of the people. Accordingly, the           
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commitment of the citizens to the state means a commitment to the existence of the               
Jewish state (Azoulay and Ophir, 2012).​2 The perception of Israel as a democratic state              
despite its national-ethnic nature, receives further justification and legitimacy by the           
continuous overriding political concern with ‘security’.  
The employment of the term ‘security’ in Israel is pervasive and encompasses all             
spheres of life, and is being utilised at all times without the need to specify the reasons                 
for its operations (Esmeir, 2004). Accordingly, the Israeli Security Agency (​Shin Bet​) is             
entrusted with maintaining the Jewish character of the state and acting against any             
subversive practices that undermine this definition (Khoury and Yoez, 2007). The           
consensus view in Jewish-Israeli society is that of continuous, existential danger           
(​Sakana Kiyumit ​) to the very existence of the state. Israelis has internalised this feeling              
of danger and this expresses itself in the terminology with which the people use to speak                
about the conflict with the Arab states, understand Iran’s nuclear programme, or            
perceive the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. For what concerns us, this             
is also how anti-Zionist resistance practices, in which Jewish-Israelis are involved, are            
being treated. The perception of ‘existential danger’ has turned into an important            
component of Israeli ‘security culture’. One of its manifestations is the ongoing legal             
‘state of emergency’, activated in Israel from the day of its establishment until the              
present day.​3 ​The ‘state of emergency’ allows the security apparatus to act in ways that               
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contradict the norms and laws that form the basis of democracy, without attracting             
public criticism. Indeed, ‘security measures’ and ‘emergency regulations’ are being          
endorsed and are seen as a necessary and inevitable part of the life in Israel (Pedhazur,                
2003). Security concerns thus create a strong bond between the Jewish citizens and the              
regime. Hence, many scholars describe Israeli society as a ‘conscripted society’ (for            
example, see Kimmerling, 2001; Ophir and Peled, 2001). Similarly, Israel is described            
as a ‘nation in arms’; thereby Jewish identity in Palestine was constructed mainly             
through the militarisation of society where the army served as an agent of development              
and integration (Ben-Eliezer, 1998; Kimmerling, 2001). ‘Media in arms’ is a term            
referring to the co-option and recruitment of the Israeli media on behalf of this ‘nation               
in arms’, thus curbing any significant criticism or alternative thinking in Israeli society             
(Pappé, 2011). All those examples reflect the unity of ends and means of the              
apparatuses of the state (and society) in the production of the Zionist common sense.              
These will also become apparent in the way anti-Zionist resistance is understood and             
treated in Israel.  
Despite the debate on the essence of Israel’s democracy, scholars agree that            
formal democratic institutions and processes do exist, including free elections, the           
separation of powers and the rule of law maintained by an independent judicial system.​4              
This point is crucial for the analysis of the forms of resistance presented here, as the                
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democratic structures enable forms of resistance that would not be available otherwise.            
At the same time, the settler colonial drive and the ethno-national component in the              
state’s definition are impeding its democratic structures. Moreover, resistance of the           
kinds discussed here puts a strain on the democratic structures, and pushes the state to               
rely more on its ethno-national component and thereby to lose its stance and legitimacy              
as ‘the only democracy in the Middle East’. It is a strategy that exposes the               
contradictions between the state’s Jewish and democratic pretensions, showing its          
willingness to suspend the one to defend the other, thereby revealing its coercive side.  
 
Benvenisti’s reflections presented above highlight the Jewish-Israeli common sense         
perception of the existing social order as sacred, to which obedience is the highest              
‘social test’, and they are used here as a point of departure into a discussion regarding                
the strategy of resistance that chooses to subvert, overlook and disregard the existing             
norms, institutions and framework of the state. Given this very short introduction into             
the Israeli ‘common sense’ perception, I would argue that the resistance practices of             
anti-Zionist Jewish-Israelis, activities that disregard laws or military orders, and          
undermine, in their essence, the very idea of Zionism and its manifestations in             
current-day Israel, constitute an educational process, a Gramscian and Freirean          
counterhegemony​ and ​critical pedagogy​. 
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1. Counterhegemony and critical pedagogy  
Since Zionism, as an ideology and a system of power, is considered here as hegemonic               
in the Israeli state, anti-Zionist resistance is synonymous with the construction of a             
counterhegemonic project. Antonio Gramsci (1977, 1988) understood hegemony both         
as a form of rule – a way in which power is organised (in which terms he referred to it                    
as the hegemony of the bourgeoisie), and as a strategy of struggle and an aim in itself                 
(the establishment of the hegemony of the working class). In his discussion of             
hegemony as a field of struggle fought in the ‘redoubts of civil society’, Gramsci puts               
emphasis on the creation of a ‘collective will’, constructed of an ensemble of social              
groups with the aim of unifying the whole society around the political struggle. In order               
to achieve this, the disintegration of the bases of the existing hegemony, by             
disarticulating the ideological bloc of the existing intellectual position, is imperative.           
The precondition for this is the ability to rearticulate a new ideological system that will               
serve as cement for the new hegemonic bloc, incorporating national-popular ideological           
elements into a new hegemonic principle in a way that will represent the general              
interest. 
Hegemony, therefore, must be understood as a process, an open-ended          
construction, and its forms can be partial, strong or weak, and include concealed             
8 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage  in ​Ethnicities ​Vol. 17 No. 4 pp. 
574-597​. ​Published version available from: ​https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796816666593 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: ​http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24986/  
contradictions and fractures, as well as meanings and resources that are not fully             
controllable. Counterhegemony can therefore be explained as ‘any practice that          
diminishes the number of sites of hegemonic articulation, reduces their range of            
application and makes them disarticulate and break up, thereby exposing [...] the growth             
of violence and coercion in the social….’ (Chalcraft, 2007: 181). 
Building counterhegemony, following the footsteps of Gramsci is, first and          
foremost, an educational process in which some agents within society are taking a             
pivotal role. Gramsci called those agents the ​organic intellectuals​: the organisers,           
educators, and moral/intellectual leaders of a given social group or class that are             
distinguished by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to              
which they organically belong, rather than by their profession; and by their ability to              
achieve a unity of theory and practice, thinking and feeling (Gramsci, 1988: 5–23).             
Edward Said’s treatment of what he terms the ‘oppositional intellectual’ follows similar            
lines. Said argues that the intellectual is ‘someone whose place it is publicly to raise               
embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce           
them)…’ (Said, 1996: 11). Thus, simply put, the role of the contemporary intellectual is              
to speak ‘truth to power’. In Said, the ‘organic’ connection is to a community of               
belonging, ‘the nation’, rather than class as Gramsci intended, a categorisation that is             
useful for our purposes. The role of the intellectual here is to critique the ‘common               
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sense’ perceptions that prevail in society, and to offer a new vision of the world instead.                
This includes a capacity for comprehending such a world, hence new vocabulary,            
knowledge and discourse. In so doing, intellectuals engage in a practice of education.  
On the importance of the education in the struggle for liberation from oppression,              
the writing of the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (2005) is instructive. What Freire             
terms ​critical pedagogy constitutes a revolutionary strategy that centres upon the           
transformative power of ideas, education, and the intellectuals. For Freire, pedagogy           
‘makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection […], and from that reflection will              
come the[ir] necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation.’ (Freire, 2005:            
48). Moreover, he insisted on the importance of critical thinking, as it ‘discerns an              
indivisible solidarity between the world and the people and admits of no dichotomy             
between them – thinking which perceives reality as process, as transformation, rather            
than as a static entity – thinking which does not separate itself from action, but               
constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved.’ (2005: 92).             
This approach, similarly to Gramsci’s, is grounded in the philosophy of praxis: one that              
begins with life rather than theory, and constitutes acts that shape and change reality.              
Indeed, praxis is the combination of thought and action, a critical ‘reflection and action              
upon the world in order to transform it’ (2005: 51). Thus, it is the role of the organic                  
intellectual to be the one who ignites, directs and disseminates the ideas that constitute a               
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new conception of the world in society that is crucial for the construction of              
counterhegemony (Hussein, 2015: 43).  
Gramsci’s and Freire’s construction of counterhegemony is based upon a political           
theory in which the central protagonist is the intellectual/educator, and in which the             
politics of knowledge plays a central role in either enabling or disempowering social             
change. This insistence on the fundamental importance and primacy of the ideological            
struggle to social change means that the struggle should not be limited to consciousness              
raising, but must aim at consciousness transformation among the wider society. Critical            
pedagogy as the praxis of the intellectuals/educators’ role is not limited to merely             
convincing their audience of their message, but also to build a new capacity for              
understanding it, to open new sensibilities, create a new language and with it a new type                
of a political subject (Freire, 2005; Gramsci, 1971: 325–332). 
Critical pedagogy is thus strictly connected to the Gramscian concept of the ​war of              
position​: the long process of ideological struggle, the process of transformation,           
disarticulation and re-articulation of existing ideological elements through which the          
new hegemonic bloc is cemented (Mouffe, 1979). This strategy aims at exposing the             
inherent weaknesses inside the hegemonic order that are an integral part of its character              
and internal contradictions. Its goal is to push towards the situation in which what was               
previously tolerated or considered as a legitimate disciplinary action within hegemony           
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will come to be understood as outright oppression, and the struggle itself as legitimate              
resistance to it (Noorani, 2007).  
 
Here, it is about anti-Zionist resistance that pushes the Israeli state to defend its ‘Jewish’               
character, at the expense of the ‘democracy’ component, thus exposing the contradiction            
inherent in this combination, and push the state to reveal its oppressive nature. This              
article presents and discusses the activities of two anti-Zionist ‘groups’ operating in            
Israel: the AATW, engaged in direct actions and the Boycott! Supporting the Palestinian             
Boycott, Divestments and Sanctions (BDS) Call from Within (in short: BFW).           
Appearing as visionaries of a new world view which is strictly oppositional to the one               
the Zionist common sense dictates, I would suggest that the AATW and the BFW              
should be understood and conceptualised as Gramscian/Saidian organic/oppositional        
intellectuals, and their resistance would be treated here as a practice of Freirean critical              
pedagogy. These activists, mostly originating from an affluent, Ashkenazi middle-class          
background, are creating a praxis of struggle, and a discourse which counters the one              
maintained by their hegemonic social/ethnic counterparts, and thus can be categorised           
as ‘organic’. These two groups actually intersect and overlap, while most members of             
the AATW are also members of the BFW group, and vice versa. Indeed, these are both                
sides of the same struggle – from inside, on the ground and outside – appealing to                
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international public opinion.  
2. Anarchists against the wall 
AATW is a direct action group, inspired by the South African resistance movement, that              
was formed in April 2003 in response to the construction of the wall in the occupied                
West Bank. Ever since its formation, the group has participated in hundreds of             
demonstrations and direct actions against the wall specifically, and the occupation           
generally, in the West Bank as well as within Green Line Israel.  
AATW activists join the Palestinian-led struggle against the occupation and the           
wall, coordinated through the Palestinian villages’ local popular committees. This point           
is crucial, as one of AATW’s activists explained, since the AATW activists are ‘among              
the group of the over-privileged in this struggle for Palestinian rights, acting against a              
system that has at its very core the Zionist principle of differentiation’ (interview with              
an activist, 30 July 2012).​5 Accordingly, it is not a ‘joint struggle’ in the manner it is                 
commonly described, but a Palestinian struggle which anti-Zionist Israeli (and          
international) activists join and lend their support to.​6 The AATW mission, as it appears              
on the AATW Facebook page declares that: 
 
It is the duty of Israeli citizens to resist immoral policies and actions carried out in                
our name. We believe that it is possible to do more than demonstrate inside Israel               
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or participate in humanitarian relief actions. Israeli apartheid and occupation are           
not going to end by themselves – they will end when they become ungovernable              
and unmanageable. It is time to physically oppose the bulldozers, the army and the              
occupation.  
 
The group’s nature and patterns of activity are revealed in conversations with its             
activists. The AATW is not an organisation, but rather, a loose group of people,              
working together in a non-hierarchical and horizontal mode of operation, with no            
central leadership. Decisions are taken together, in consultation within meetings or           
during operations, but always in response to the Palestinian needs and calls for support              
(interview with an activist, 24 December 2009). This is a vital principle: the popular              
resistance movement is first and foremost Palestinian, and ‘the Israelis are a mere             
footnote in it’ (Pollack as quoted in Hass, 2010).  
AATW’s presence as a group in demonstrations provides Palestinian civilians          
some degree of protection against army violence. The Israeli army’s code of conduct is              
significantly different when Israelis are present and the tendency to resort to violence is              
significantly lower, even though still severe. The army tries to put an end to the               
Palestinian popular resistance using every form of repression, and to prevent Israeli            
activists from joining this struggle, using legal means. A military decree determines that             
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Israeli citizens are not allowed to enter the Palestinian Authority’s controlled areas ‘A’             
as marked in the Oslo Accords.​7 Frequently, a military commander’s order declares the             
area of the demonstrations a ‘closed military zone’ to which entry is denied. Since under               
the law of the occupation it is possible to indict people for participating in a               
demonstration, in the course of several years AATW activists have been arrested            
hundreds of times and dozens of indictments have been filed against them. In             
conversations with activists, many mentioned legal repression as an attempt by the state             
to crack down on the resistance. Indeed, the human and financial burden on the activists               
is severe, and activists complain about burnout, and some of them feel forced to leave               
the country in order to restore some sense of normalcy to their lives.  
It is interesting to think about the patterns of activities of the AATW in light of                
Gramsci’s counterhegemony and Freire’s critical pedagogy, and to conceptualise these          
activists as organic intellectuals operating within Israeli society. In what follows, we            
will understand their strategies, and their effects. The most common strategy of            
resistance of the AATW is direct action. Direct action, as one of the activists explains,               
‘deals specifically and directly with the source of the problem, and not only with its               
representations, such as demonstrating in front of the Ministry of Defence or in the              
streets of Green Line Israel’ (interview with an activist, 24 December 2009). Thus,             
direct action has an effect on the realities on the ground since ‘we go and dismantle a                 
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road block or a checkpoint and we open a road, clean a well or a cave’ (interview with                  
an activist, 22 December 2009). For example, in the area of the south of Mount Hebron,                
the outcomes of the AATW actions could be seen on the ground, where families came               
back to live in the caves and used the clean wells after the prolonged cleaning activity                
conducted there (interview with an activist, 16 August 2010). Direct action is a practical              
demand, and there is typically a shortage of people who are willing to take part in these                 
activities, As another activist explains, ‘what is always missing is the struggle and             
resistance on the ground. This is a pragmatic matter, this is what is needed, and this is                 
what we [AATW] do’ (interview with an activist, 4 January 2010).  
Direct action is the embodiment of ‘the move from the symbolic to the physical              
and material world. Even if actions can still be symbolic sometimes, they are             
nonetheless real’ (interview with an activist, 24 December 2009). ​Indeed, there is            
always a spectrum and there is no one point between the symbolic or the real, every                
action embodies both, as one of the activists explains (interview, 4 January 2010)             
explains: 
 
​I think that a series of demonstrations in one village can help, if it means delaying                 
the construction of the wall, and entails expenses and losses for the state and the               
army. Every day of delay in construction means losses of thousands of Shekels….             
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You cannot break the whole wall in one day, but you can create an accumulative               
effect. 
 
The activities of the AATW in the West Bank thus aim to shift the balance of power                  
against the occupation, and to create constant resistance to it, in a way that makes life                
harder for the army.  
Importantly, the resistance activities of the AATW lead to the exposure of the             
reality of oppression, separation and denial of rights that Palestinians suffer from to both              
a local and international public. This necessitates engagement in developing and           
maintaining relations with the media. Activists testify that this can be hard and             
frustrating work, but its importance is immense. The exposure in the media gives             
resistance coverage, and many people become aware of the realities the Palestinians are             
suffering from under Israeli military occupation, which are normally kept hidden by the             
Israeli state. While sporadic demonstrations or activities frequently go unnoticed,          
continuous demonstrations in a certain location tend to gain the media’s attention and             
lead to the exposure of the whole project of the wall piece-by-piece. This message is               
directed also towards the outside, international media outlets that influence international           
public opinion. In the case of Israel, where international public opinion plays a role in               
the conflict, and Israel is struggling to maintain its positive image, this is an important               
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outcome to keep in mind (interview with an activist, 16 August 2010). 
In a similar way, activities often aim to emphasise the absurdity of the situation on               
the ground. For example, building an ‘outpost’ in the vicinity of an existing settlement,              
as activists together with their Palestinian counterparts have done on several occasions            
(to name just two of these occasions: Levy, 2013; The Social TV, 2007), is an activity                
that is directed both to the international and the Israeli media, and made in order to point                 
to the outright discriminative manner with which these issues are treated by the Israeli              
government and military.  
The exposure of reality goes beyond an influence on public opinion, and infiltrates             
the legal sphere. The media coverage the struggle receives influences the parallel legal             
struggle that is conducted against the construction of different sections of the wall. The              
case of the Israeli Supreme Court 2007 judgment on the construction of the wall near               
the West Bank village of Bil’in is a striking example of this.​8 Over there, the massive                
popular struggle uniting Palestinian, Israeli and international activists was caught up by            
the media, and became familiar all over the country. Michael Sfard, a human rights              
lawyer that handled the Bil’in case, recounted that once he arrived at the Supreme Court               
for the discussion of the case, Chief Justice Aaron Barak asked him, “what is so special                
about Bil’in that they demonstrate there for so long?” (interview with Michael Sfard, 30              
December 2009). This, for Sfard, is an example of the way in which the popular               
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struggle had succeeded in making Bil’in’s struggle unique, a fact that made the             
difference in the court’s ruling: 
 
There are 100 petitions against the construction of the wall. You have to make              
yours unique. And the popular struggle in Bil’in succeeded in doing so. A             
convention was created that ‘this time we went too far’ [in the decision to build               
the wall at that particular spot]. Therefore, I can say that the popular struggle goes               
hand in hand with the legal one.   
 
Other actions inside Israel are meant to raise awareness of a policy or event that               
otherwise would remain hidden from the eyes of the public. For example, one of those               
actions is called ‘Price Tag’. ‘Price Tag’ is the term used to describe actions taken by                
Jewish-Israeli extreme right-wing activists in the OPT, mainly from 2008 onwards           
against Palestinians and their property, but also towards the police, the military and, in              
some cases, towards radical anti-Zionist activists. These actions include physical attacks           
(most recently, in the summer of 2015, the burning of a house in the Palestinian village                
of Duma, where an 18-month-old baby and his parents were burnt to death), causing              
damage to property and mosques, spraying graffiti on holy sites, uprooting olive trees,             
burning fields, and assaults on police officers or military property, among others.            
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According to extreme right-wing activists, these are done in response to governmental            
decisions to dismantle ‘illegal’ constructions in outposts or to Palestinian attacks. In            
response to the right-wing ‘Price Tag’ actions, on April 2011, AATW activists printed             
price tags (labels) and attached them onto the original price tags in shops in Tel Aviv,                
Jerusalem and elsewhere, mainly in large fashion chains such as Zara and Mango. The              
idea was to disrupt the shoppers and the shopping experience and to raise awareness of               
the real meaning of the concept of a price tag: on the labels they added a short report on                   
‘price tag’ actions taken by right-wing activists (Sheizaf, 2011: 26). This form of protest              
was also meant to create a connection between the Israeli consumerist culture and the              
systems that enable the occupation of Palestinian territories. The link is found in the fact               
that Tel Aviv is perceived by most people (locals and foreigners) as a nice international               
city, with a shopping experience similar to one in London or New York, where one can                
shop in the same global brands such as Zara or H&M, and where the same musical                
bands perform. This ‘normality’ enables and facilitates the feeling that life in Tel Aviv              
is normal, and that the oppression and violence are part of another, perhaps parallel,              
world. As Noam Sheizaf affirms: ‘the [AATW] price tag action is spoiling the             
entertainment and shopping festivities of the Israeli routine for a moment…. The aim             
was achieved. The euphemism is broken, and we got another little reminder that after              
all, the situation here is not so normal’ (2011: 26). 
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Another dimension of exposure/education surfaces if one examines AATW         
activities inside Green Line Israel, ones that are done rarely but considered ‘according             
to the need’ (interview with an activist, 4 January 2010). While most activists agree that               
these are not meant to convince the Israeli public, since they all affirmed that they gave                
up any hope for a change from within Israeli (Jewish) society, these actions are meant to                
be communicative in their disruptive nature, in their ability to create confusion and             
chaos. They are also assisting the group to form its community. For example, during              
Israel’s escalation of violence on the Gaza Strip in 2008/9, known as ‘Operation Cast              
Lead’ several activists conducted direct action in Sde Dov military airport, located in             
the north of Tel Aviv, blocking with their bodies the entrance to the base, and               
attempting to prevent pilots from accessing the jet planes on their way to attack Gaza.               
They were wearing white masks and covered in fake blood, laying at the entrance to the                
base playing dead. Ayala, one of the protestors said that the protest was meant to ‘show                
Israeli Air Force pilots the results of their actions in Gaza. […] We came here to remind                 
them of this’ (Ilani, 2009). Other actions inside Israel are meant to raise awareness of a                
policy or event that otherwise would remain hidden from the eyes of the public, such as                
blocking roads in Tel Aviv with barbed wired from the separation wall (Haaretz             
Service, 2007). 
Another educative/subversive dimension of their activity surfaces in the         
21 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage  in ​Ethnicities ​Vol. 17 No. 4 pp. 
574-597​. ​Published version available from: ​https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796816666593 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: ​http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24986/  
examination of the nature of the activity. Apart from the purpose of the action itself, the                
very nature of the AATW struggle is subversive as it stands against the Israeli separatist               
policies that are meant to keep Jews and Palestinians apart. The struggle includes Jews              
and Palestinians, in a way that each side contributes what it can to the struggle, and                
increases each other’s strength. The Palestinians are the initiators, the leaders, they            
bring the most ‘manpower’ to the struggle, and they are sacrificing much more, since              
they are the ones that suffer constantly from the direct oppression of the army, and the                
extensive arrests and harassments. The Israeli activists contribute in attracting media           
attention, gaining access to land and resources since they enjoy freedom of movement,             
but remain more as the ‘silent partners’ in the struggle (interview with an activist, 4               
January 2010). Considering Israel’s policies, this type of struggle is subversive by its             
very nature.  
Moreover, these activities are educating the public about the fact that another            
reality is possible. Direct action and resistance on the ground symbolise the constant             
struggle against the boundaries and borders imposed by the state, which are aimed to              
separate Israelis from Palestinians, and borders that have become firm both physically            
and consciously for most Israelis. To this end, there are laws and decrees that prevent               
Israelis entering Palestinian cities, towns and villages in the OPT. The AATW’s            
struggle is meant to dismantle existing distinctions, and at the same time, to point to               
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them and show them to the public (interview with an activist, 7 January 2010). In this                
way, demonstrating in the West Bank together with the local Palestinian population            
should be understood as a highly subversive activity since it is resisting Israel’s attempt              
to create a strict separation between the two populations. The very act of the struggle               
together is undermining this separation, ‘you cross checkpoints and borders in order to             
struggle together against the separation, in this sense, it is an anti-apartheid action’             
(interview with an activist, 24 December 2009). Therefore, there is a long-term            
educational goal here, which involves lessons about how to live together, and how to get               
out of the indoctrination in a way that will enable a different future for the people. 
In sum, the AATW actions are meant to disrupt, to create chaos, to interfere and               
make the army spend its resources on dealing with the constant harassments that the              
demonstrations or actions are causing on the ground. Moreover, they are meant to raise              
awareness in the public, disrupt the daily routine, make people stop, think and realise              
the reality they live in.  
AATW activists are, by definition, supporters of the Boycott, Divestment and           
Sanctions (BDS) call, promoted by the Palestinian civil society in 2005. It is an              
inside-outside simultaneous strategy that demands Israel stops its violation of          
Palestinian rights. It is therefore a continuation of the same strategy, using different             
tactics. 
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3. Boycott! Supporting the Palestinian BDS call from within 
On 9 July 2005, the Palestinian civil society, a collection of Palestinian political parties,              
unions, associations, coalitions and organisations representing the three parts of the           
Palestinian people (Palestinian refugees, Palestinians under occupation and Palestinian         
citizens) issued a call for boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel ‘until it             
complies with international law and universal principles of human rights’. According to            
the call, these non-violent, punitive measures should be maintained until Israel meets its             
obligation to ‘recognise the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination          
and fully complies with the precepts of international law’.​9 These include ending the             
occupation and colonisation; recognising the rights of the Palestinian citizens of Israel            
to full equality and respecting, protecting and promoting the right of return of the              
Palestinians refugees according to UN resolution 194.  
The emergence of the BDS movement was inspired by the South African model             
of the international solidarity movement that waged a BDS campaign at the time of              
apartheid. Currently, the BDS is an international movement with growing number of            
people from around the world participating and collaborating at an increasing pace. But,             
whereas the Palestinian BDS call and movement has broad support within Palestinian            
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society, BFW is a marginal group in Israel in terms of its narrow membership and the                
inadmissibility of its message within Israel itself.  
The involvement of Israeli citizens in boycott-related activities predates the formal           
Palestinian call of 2005. For many years, Israelis who chose to respect and promote the               
rights of the Palestinians have done so based on personal interaction and on a relatively               
small scale. Those few conscientious Israelis, as one of the activists explains, ‘have also              
paid a personal price for speaking up and taking the side of the oppressed, and in trying                 
to minimise such events in the future we decided to answer the 2005 Palestinian call for                
BDS as a group, allowing for those who wish to remain anonymous to still be active as                 
well as allowing for like-minded individuals to join in’ (interview with an activist, 30              
July 2012). The ‘Boycott! Supporting the Palestinian BDS Call from Within’ group was             
finally officially formed in 2008. Its long name puts the emphasis on the group’s role in                
supporting an existing and ongoing struggle rather than a creation of a new front of               
struggle. As the same activist explains: ‘Our job is, therefore, not to come up with               
demands, but rather use our relative power to act as enablers for the needed change –                
being among the privileged, the mode of struggle is not ours to dictate, but it is certainly                 
our duty to participate’ (interview with an activist, 30 July 2012). 
The role of BFW is to support the international BDS call against Israel and              
legitimise it, to stress that it is directed towards Israeli governmental policies and Israeli              
25 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage  in ​Ethnicities ​Vol. 17 No. 4 pp. 
574-597​. ​Published version available from: ​https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796816666593 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: ​http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24986/  
institutions and not Israeli individuals, and therefore that it is not anti-Semitic (as it is               
commonly portrayed by its opponents), but rather an anti-racist stance. As Tali Shapiro             
(2010), a member of BFW explains: 
 
Israelis do have that unique role in the BDS movement […] one of our roles is to                 
‘kosher stamp’ the movement, but that’s hardly our only role, and we’re not the              
first in history to hold this status. Whites did it in South Africa, in the US,                
Christian Germans in Nazi Germany, veterans do it in the anti-war movement            
[…]. They can choose to be a tool, or they can choose to take an active, thinking                 
part. […] We commit much of our time, resources and energy, and we do it               
knowing the consequences. We initiate and we join – that is what activists do.  
 
The stated goals of the group are therefore to promote and support the Palestinian BDS               
call, and to act inside and outside Israel to raise awareness and encourage support for               
BDS. Until today, around 300 Israeli citizens and residents have signed the call. It is a                
very small minority group, but considering the BDS movement as a whole, its potential              
danger for the Israeli state and the effects of its activity are tremendous. 
Support of BDS is an act of resistance that consists of the call to the world to put                  
pressure on Israel to radically change its policies and to respect international law and              
human rights in regard to Palestinian rights of self-determination, freedom and equality            
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in Palestine. The main idea behind the BDS campaign is that Israelis will only be               
convinced to push their government to change its policies if the costs of maintaining the               
current situation become too high. It is an offensive-initiative act of resistance, rather             
than a defensive-responsive one like direct action. As Udi Aloni (2010) explains: ‘BDS             
action is a life saving antidote to violence. It is an action of solidarity, partnership and                
joint progress. BDS action serves to preempt in a non-violent manner, justified violent             
resistance aimed at attaining the same goals of justice, peace and equality.’ Following             
this line of thought, there is a clear educational message to the BDS campaign, and               
accordingly, the Gramscian framework of analysis suggested above would assist in the            
investigation of the patterns of resistance and the effects of this resistance on Israeli              
society. 
One important role Israelis assume in the campaign is to do research into the              
corporations and institutions supporting and legitimising Israel’s occupation, in         
coordination with the global campaign and the Palestinian BDS National Committee           
(BNC). This work is being carried out by ‘Who Profits,’ an investigation conducted by              
activists of the Coalition of Women for Peace, an Israeli feminist organisation,            
dedicated to ‘ending the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan              
Heights and reaching a just peace in Israel/Palestine’, that since 2009 has decided to              
actively support the BDS call. Their investigation aims at exposing companies and            
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corporations involved in the occupation, and to promote a change in public opinion and              
corporate policies. The information uncovered about corporations’ involvement in the          
1967 occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights is then used in                
order to increase pressure on foreign companies and corporations to apply sanctions and             
divest from those corporations. Many of Who Profits activists are among the members             
of BFW.  
While the strategy of the BDS campaign is to bring about the severing of ties               
between Israel and the international community, the effects of the campaign can be felt              
already, in the fear of losing those ties and losing international legitimacy. Tali Shapiro              
(Kilroy, 2011) explains: 
 
This pressure was instrumental in fighting the South African apartheid regime           
[…]. This doesn’t mean BDS is the only action taken. People have been taking to               
the streets in a very organised and consistent manner for years: we write, we speak               
abroad. South Africans did all this as well. Just as evil doesn’t substantially             
change through geography and time, neither do the ways to fight it effectively.  
 
One of BFW’s activists explained that the support for BDS also stems from the fact that                
activism (such as the AATW) is limited in its ability to bring about a change: ‘In                
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regards to BDS, the positive thing is that the strength of the Zionists is limited. The                
solidarity movement is deciding the moves. After all, Zionists can’t control British or             
French public opinion’ (interview with an activist, 4 January 2010). Since this BFW             
activist is also a committed AATW activist, he understands that the two forms of              
resistance are intertwined and mutually benefit each other. BDS is more of a             
middle-class activism as it involves academics and professionals, and most of the work             
is done in front of a computer.  
The BFW is therefore involved in ‘counter-branding’ Israel, advocacy and          
solidarity. ‘Who Profits’ aims to uncover and provide information about the economic            
dimension, which BFW uses in its appeals to the relevant individuals, companies or             
groups. The target is not the economy alone but also the cultural and academic spheres.               
The actual work consists of appeals to artists who intend to come and perform in Israel,                
pleading them to cancel their shows, to companies that are involved in projects in the               
OPT, to organisations and individuals who support the BDS, as a sign of solidarity and               
to fend off any accusation of anti-Semitism, and well as participating in talks in Israel               
and beyond, advocating the message of this strategy of resistance and its importance in              
the struggle for Palestinian rights.  
The work of BFW is outward facing, and its activists do not engage directly with               
the domestic sphere. Indeed many activists admit that they lost their belief in the              
29 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage  in ​Ethnicities ​Vol. 17 No. 4 pp. 
574-597​. ​Published version available from: ​https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796816666593 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: ​http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24986/  
attempt to address the moral conscience of Israeli society, and to trigger a change from               
within. This, in turn, has led to the understanding that only external pressure could              
disrupt and alter the lives of the people that are now living in relative comfort and                
detachment from the surrounding reality of occupation, oppression and discrimination          
of the Palestinians, and could make people understand that the situation is not             
sustainable and therefore needs to change. In this approach, the educational message            
becomes clear. In a conversation with another BFW activist, he claimed that his             
engagement entails at least a belief in the rationality of Israeli society, ‘that the majority               
of people in the country still desire to live and maintain certain quality of life for                
themselves, and are not driven solely by national-fanaticism. This means that with            
pressure, things can change’ (interview with an activist, 21 May 2011). It can be thus               
determined that the resistance of the BFW is an ‘end of the game’ strategy, telling               
society that it must pay a price if it continues to support the policies carried out by all                  
elected governments, that of occupation, oppression and discrimination. In sum, BFW           
activists are involved in ‘reframing’ the debate about Israel/Palestine, exposing          
weaknesses in the Zionist hegemony, and thus creating a counterhegemonic discourse. 
Another dimension of resistance/education surfaces here. Similarly to the         
AATW, if one considers the importance of interaction with Palestinians as having been,             
and continuing to be, crucial in the activists’ internal education process as it contributes              
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to the activists’ radicalisation and to the undermining of the Israeli separationist            
policies. But there are other issues related to this point. Tali Shapiro explains that              
gaining the trust of the Palestinians, enough to be welcomed into their safe spaces, is an                
indication of success, ‘our voices can only become relevant if we manage to achieve the               
latter. Otherwise, we are still the oppressors, speaking from a place of privilege. It’s              
only when we’re radical enough to step out of the binary paradigm that we can truly                
become part of the movement; otherwise, all we do is to perpetuate oppression’ (Kilroy,              
2011). Eyal Sivan, a filmmaker and supporter of the boycott campaign explains, ‘we             
have to give a new sense to the notion of what it means to be in a common struggle.                   
[…]. The official Israeli policy is about separation. We have to think, also, what it               
means to fight against separation’ (Sivan and Hammad, 2011). These comments help us             
to understand that there is another, long-term educational goal here, which involves            
lessons about how to live together, how to get out of the indoctrination that people are                
brought up with, in a way that will enable a different future in the land. Indeed, it is the                   
praxis of struggle that educated those who struggle about alternative possibilities of            
existence.  
This is an essential point: as Freire reminded us, in the attempt of the oppressors               
to exit their position and join the struggle of the oppressed, ‘they almost always bring               
with them the marks of their origin: their prejudices and their deformations, which             
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include a lack of confidence in the people’s ability to think, to want, and to know’                
(Freire, 2005: 50). Hence, an act of true solidarity with the struggle of the oppressed               
necessitates a process of ‘rebirth’ and a constant self-examination: ‘those who undergo            
it must take on a new form of existence; they can no longer remain as they were.’ (2005:                  
61). Accordingly, the process of internal education is of outmost importance to the             
activists themselves.  
The educational message also surfaces through the evaluation of the effects of            
their activity on the Zionist discourse and the way they manage to ‘get under the skin’                
of the Israeli society. This can be done through the examination of the hegemonic              
backlash to their activities that serves as an indication for the efficacy of this type of                
resistance. The harsher the repression is, and the more severe the reactions, indicates             
that the state perceives these activities as potentially dangerous and harmful. It is             
important to remember at this point that hegemony constitutes a delicate balance            
between consent and coercion, with the latter to be kept under strict control and careful               
use, in order for it not to become direct domination that relies on force alone.               
Nevertheless, the role of coercion to control those who cannot be co-opted otherwise is              
important, and cannot be ignored. When the balance tips to the coercive end of              
hegemony, it risks losing its legitimacy and justification as a ‘rule by consent’. This is a                
process that the Israeli state undergoes. Additionally, these reactions embody a           
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discursive change within Israeli society, regarding its self-perception. While it cannot be            
attributed to the work of the BFW alone, the impact of the BDS movement inside Israel                
can be evaluated through an examination of the discourse of those in the centres of               
power in Israeli hegemony: the media, parliament and the economy.  
Every year, the Israeli government and civil society organisations are investing           
resources in the attempt to counter the BDS movement-led ‘delegitimation campaign’           
that is considered by the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs to be equal to the threats                
posed by Iran, Hizballah or Hamas (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010), and to              
concentrate its efforts in public diplomacy (​Hasbara​)​10 activities. The Israeli media           
increasingly reports on boycott attempts and successes, and promotes public          
counter-campaigns to combat the ‘BDS threat’. One of those is ‘#LOVEISRAEL,           
telling the true story of Israel’, led by Peri Holding Group and Mako, the online               
interface of the Israeli popular TV Channel 2, that offers to invest one million NIS in an                 
idea that will be chosen to ‘join the struggle on our image in the world.’​11 On July 2015,                  
the Israeli economic daily, ​Calcalist​, exposed a report already prepared by the Ministry             
of Finance in 2013, estimating the annual damage that would be caused to the Israeli               
economy by a total boycott at 40 billion NIS (Amsterdamski, 2015). On June 2015, the               
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed in a special address, that            
boycott threats are directed at ‘the very existence of the State of Israel, not on its policy’                 
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(Nana10, 2015). These are only a few, albeit important, examples of a political             
discourse, recruited media, and the signalling of BDS as the ‘threat’ to the Zionist              
project, that almost all means become legitimate in the battle to combat it. This battle               
intensifies when the state is exercising its coercive forces to silence its critics using              
legal, and other, means.  
The anti-boycott law that the Israeli parliament passed in 2011 presents one            
interesting example of this process (The Knesset, 2011). The law allows those who             
regard themselves to have been harmed by a boycott to sue the person/s responsible for               
compensation.​12 ​The law came under severe criticism, for placing limitations on the            
freedom of expression. Thus, by ​enacting this law, Israel has damaged its reputation and              
eroded its legitimacy, both internally, at least amongst liberal circles, and           
internationally, where Israel struggles hard to maintain its positive liberal-democratic          
image.​13 ​This controversial law was subsequently suspended, but finally approved by           
the Israeli Supreme Court on February 2014, with minor amendments. ​Certainly,           
attempts at repressing resistance, by legislative or other means, expose the weaknesses            
of hegemony and shake its delicate balance​: resistance forces hegemony to resort to             
coercive means, such as legislation of this type which, in turn, erodes its consensual              
base and sources of legitimacy, which are both vital parts of its strength, locally and               
internationally, and exposes its repressive side.  
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Many of the activists (of both AATW and BFW) have been targeted by Israeli              
security forces, including ‘friendly’ questioning, interrogations and arrests, mainly in          
the cases of participation in direct actions and demonstrations in the OPT. However, it is               
important to underline the fact that (until this day) the Israeli state hesitates to exercise               
direct repression towards Jewish-Israeli activists. Activists argue that this is done in an             
attempt to keep their activity in a marginal position, and away from the eye of the                
media. Indeed, cases of imprisonment of Jewish-Israeli activists are very rare, especially            
when compared to the level of repression exercised on Palestinian political activity, first             
and foremost on Palestinian inhabitants in the OPT but also in regard to Palestinian              
citizens of Israel, where Israel commonly uses arrests as deterrence (Asali and Baker,             
2010). The repression of protest activity by Palestinian citizens is tolerated and accepted             
by the Jewish-Israeli public as legitimate control over ‘subversive activity’ from the            
kind that is identified with Israel’s enemies, and aims to undermine the very existence              
of the Jewish state. On the contrary, the repression of the protests of Jewish citizens,               
even if belongs to the same ideological frame, is still considered to be less legitimate in                
the public’s opinion, and is therefore not widely used. This means that a space for               
activism does exist. At the same time, this space is tightly controlled by the state that                
regulates and maintains it under its supervision. In this way, it can also maintain the               
resistance in its marginal position. 
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Repression is not found in the realm of state institutions alone. After all, the              
strength of hegemony generates a coherence of interests and means between the            
political (state) and civil society, while the latter can step in to suppress forms of               
resistance that are perceived to threaten its integrity. Indeed, activists of the BFW face              
forms of repression exercised by civil society, though it is often backed by official state               
representatives. These sometimes stem from the work of resourceful NGOs that are            
dedicated to monitoring and tracing these kinds of activities and who have access to              
political power in the state; the most prominent among these are the ‘Israel Academia              
Monitor’ (IAM) and ‘Im Tirzu’. While the former is engaged mainly with tracing and              
exposing academics who actively support the BDS campaign, the latter is dedicated to             
Hasbara activities in the campuses and to public campaigns, conventions and tours that             
include witch-hunts and campaign against academics, and organisations that they          
consider are not Zionist enough (or at all). Reports prepared by these organisations are              
occasionally discussed in parliamentary committees’ meetings; thus they have an actual           
effect on the political decision-making process.​14 
Academic members of BFW suffer from harassment and attempts to threaten           
their position in their workplace in Israeli academia. At times, they are summoned for              
‘talks’ with the rector of their universities, in an attempt to constrain their activity and               
threaten their position in the university (interview with an activist, 7 January 2010). In              
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another extreme example, Neve Gordon, a lecturer from Ben Gurion University who            
published an article in 2009 in the ​Los Angeles Times determining that Israel is an               
apartheid state and therefore must be boycotted economically, culturally and politically,           
was denounced and urged to resign by the university’s president, Professor Rivka Carmi             
(Benhorin, 2009).  
Overall, one cannot underestimate the effect the BFW and the BDS campaign            
has on Israeli society and its political system, both discursively and practically. It is              
possible to detect a discursive change, both in Israeli society and internationally about             
Israel and its policies, more openly recognising Israel’s democratic deficit and           
oppressive policies towards Palestinians, citizens and occupied population. Internally,         
the BDS campaign has two contradictory effects. While on the one hand it can lead to                
societal pressure on the government to change, or at least review, its policies, on the               
other hand, it creates a feeling of ‘siege,’ in which the international community is              
perceived as turning against ‘Israel’, ‘Israelis’ and sometimes, for utilitarian purposes –            
against Jews, and therefore it is portrayed as anti-Semitic in nature. This, in turn, leads               
to an additional closure in Israeli society, and the entrenchment of its positions. The              
latter process is the dominant one in Israeli society. It leads to further repression and the                
use of coercion against these expressions of resistance. The statements,          
counter-campaigns and diplomatic efforts made by Israeli politicians, civil society          
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organisations and the media indicate that the BDS campaign is indeed effective. It is too               
early to assess the long-term effects and whether it will lead to a change of policies, but                 
the hegemonic reaction, in terms of both legislation and counter-BDS activity reveals its             
threatening potential. This repression and rejection of its message, forms the proof of its              
function as practice of critical pedagogy, and its counterhegemonic potential.  
 
Resistance as educational practice 
Considering Benvenisti’s comments presented at the beginning, resistance practices of          
the kinds examined above are unique in the State of Israel, where loyalty to the state                
gains a sacred place, together with the acceptance of the Zionist ideology. In this              
context, disdain, promotion of an anti-Zionist message, and direct confrontation with the            
state should be understood as a struggle for the construction of a counterhegemonic             
project that represents a different balance of political power. This process is undertaken             
by those within society who act as organic intellectuals, educating the public, willingly             
or not, about the reality, its consequences, and about the possibilities for constructing a              
different future.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note one point. Despite the subversive nature of             
their resistance activities, mostly stemming from the undermining of the separation           
policies of the Israeli state, there is a paradox embedded in these practices. The fact that                
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activists of both groups are identifiable as Israeli Jews, and using their privilege to              
enhance their struggle, unwittingly produces the very fault-line that the state is striving             
to maintain, and the activists struggle to dismantle. This paradox embodies the very             
strength of hegemonic structures, and the ambivalent nature of resistance to them.​15            
However, this is not to detract from the significance or potential of this praxis, which is                
itself has an internal-educational role, as was previously highlighted.  
I follow here Mandy Turner’s use of the decolonisation approach in the analysis             
of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli groups, as it is indeed essential to discuss, analyse and             
conceptualise the resistance of these individuals and groups from within Israeli society            
who struggle against the system of power that governs their lives and others in their               
name (Turner, 2015). As Samia Mehrez explains, a complete decolonisation process is            
one that constitutes ‘an act of confrontation with a hegemonic system of thought […].              
As such, decolonization becomes the contestation of all dominant forms and structures,            
whether they be linguistic, discursive, or ideological […] for both the colonized and the              
colonizer’. This decolonisation, for the colonisers, entails a process of liberation ‘[…]            
from imperialist, racist perceptions, representations, and institutions’ (Mehrez, 1991:         
258). This is indeed a long and sometimes painful process of learning, and the praxis of                
struggle serves as the educative method.  
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Hence, a complete decolonisation approach must include those from within the           
colonising society, however small and marginal a group they may be, together with the              
(greater role of the) colonised. Therefore, in the larger frame of resistance to Zionism              
and the Israeli state as its embodiment, Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionist activists must be            
included, and their patterns of resistance studied and conceptualised as a long process of              
learning and educating. The resistance practices of the AATW and the BFW group are              
telling in this regard, as in their modes of action, in their thinking and practice, they                
produce and disseminate knowledge, and, even if unwillingly and through their           
rejection, repression and persecution, educate the Israeli public about the alternative           
possibilities of existing. Here, it is worth mentioning that the decolonisation process,            
‘requires not the restoration of a historically continuous and allegedly pure pre-colonial            
heritage, but an imaginative creation of a new form of consciousness and way of life’               
(Nederveen and Parekh, 1995: 3). The decolonisation of imagination, a concept which is             
closely related to that of the creation of alternative hegemonic common sense, ‘is             
closely linked to structural change, at a level at which, no matter the seeming historical               
or cultural continuity, new types of legitimation and therefore, ‘imagination’ occur’           
(O’Callaghan, 1995: 22). This is a process that must begin in the minds of the few, and                 
expand throughout society, a long and steady war of position. 
Notes 
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1. The incident was reported in the ​New York Times​, the BBC, the ​Financial Times and                
the ​Jerusalem Post​, among others. 
 
2. Similar discussions can be found also in Bishara (1993, 1996).  
 
3. In fact, the ‘state of emergency’ predated the state itself and was established by the                
British Mandatory Government in 1945.  
 
4. Even critical accounts such as Azoulay and Ophir (2012) emphasise this point; see              
also Peled and Shafir (2002). Oren Yiftachel (2006) also maintains that Israel holds at              
least a formal procedural democracy while being an ‘ethnocracy’. Ethnocracy, a term            
coined by Yiftachel, describes a system of rule that is constituted by and for a dominant                
ethnic group. In this regime, a separation exists between pseudo-democratic          
characteristics such as free elections, freedom of religion and freedoms of expression,            
and the structure that reflects clear ethnic discrimination such as immigration laws, land             
laws, divisions of capital and resources.  
 
5. All interviews with activists have been anonymised. This was done in order to              
protect the identity of those activists in the event that involvement in such activism and               
the expression of such views might be subjected to greater repression. 
 
6. The issue of the ‘joint struggle’ was at the centre of several debates among Israeli and                 
Palestinian activists. See Linah Alsaafin’s article in ​The ​Electronic Intifada from 10            
July 2012; responses by Maath Musleh on ​Beyond Compromise on 12 July 2012, and              
Cecilia Dalla Negra’s interview with Ronnie Barkan on ​The ​Electronic Intifada on 8             
August 2012, among many others.  
 
7. The Oslo II Accords, signed in September 1995, determined that the Palestinian             
Authority holds both civil and security control over areas ‘A’ that include all Palestinian              
cities in the West Bank.  
 
8. On 4 September 2007, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the state to alter the route of                 
the ‘separation fence’ at Bil’in, following a judgment that rejected the government’s            
argument that this route was chosen as necessary for security-military reasons, and            
thereby justify the current route that passes on Bil’in’s lands (Yoaz and the New              
Agencies, 2007).  
 
9. For the full Palestinian call for BDS see: ​http://www.bdsmovement.net/call  
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10. ​Hasbara​, the Hebrew word for explaining, refers to efforts dedicated to advocate             
Israeli policies and the Israeli state around the world.  
 
11. See the campaign on the Mako website at:         
http://www.mako.co.il/special-love-israel​. A similar campaign was launched by other        
media platforms such as ​Yediot Ahronot​, the most-read Israeli daily newspaper.  
 
12. The full version of the law in Hebrew is available at:            
{​https://www.nevo.co.il/law_word/law14/law-2304.pdf​} accessed 25 July 2015.  
 
13. The law drew criticism from NGOs involved in the protection of civil and human               
rights in Israel. During the stages of the readings of the law, 53 NGOs submitted a joint                 
petition to the Attorney General protesting what they defined as an attempt to silence              
criticism and legitimate protest through anti-democratic laws. In the process of its            
legislation, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) submitted a position paper             
to the Knesset’s Committee of Constitution, Law and Justice highlighting that the            
boycott is a legitimate, legal and non-violent form of political activity aimed at change,              
protest and criticism. ACRI further stresses that, from the explanatory notes to the law,              
it becomes clear that it is directed towards specific boycott initiatives, those that have to               
do with the occupation. According to ACRI, such selectivity means posing limits on             
certain types of expression that the current political majority in the Knesset disapproves             
of, and as such it undermines Israeli democracy (see Gild Hayu and Yakir, 2010). The               
law was also subject to severe international condemnation, with the editorial of ​The New              
York Times arguing on 18 July 2011, ‘​Israel’s reputation as a vibrant democracy has              
been seriously tarnished by a new law intended to stifle outspoken critics of its              
occupation of the West Bank’. Additionally, Amnesty International’s Deputy Director          
for the Middle East and North Africa, Philip Luther said, ‘despite proponents’ claims to              
the contrary, this law is a blatant attempt to stifle peaceful dissent and campaigning by               
attacking the right to freedom of expression, which all governments must uphold’            
(​Amnesty International, 2011).  
 
14. As a response to reports submitted by Im Tirzu and IAM, the Minister of Education,                
Gideon Sa’ar promised to examine these claims that he described as of great             
significance. In addition, Sa’ar said he is determined to act against faculty members             
calling for the academic boycott of Israeli universities asserting, ‘this thing is            
unacceptable’ (see the report of Kashti, 2010). The Knesset Education Committee           
conducted a discussion around the topic of ‘exclusion of Zionist positions in the             
academia’ on 2 November 2010, to which members of both Im Tirzu and the Institute               
were invited, together with the heads of all Israeli universities. In the discussion,             
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remarks were made about the unacceptability of the fact that academics support the             
boycott calls against Israeli universities in which they work. In September 2012,            
following a recommendation by an international committee established to investigate          
the academic quality of Ben Gurion University’s (BGU) Politics and Government           
Department, to revise some of its programmes and hire new staff, Israel’s Council of              
Higher Education decided to close the department altogether, forbidding it to register            
new students as of the 2013–14 academic year, due to what was described as an               
anti-Zionist bias in the department (see the report of Nesher, 2012).  
 
15. On the ambivalent nature of resistance, and the intentional use that Jewish Israeli              
activists make of their privilege in their solidarity actions in the Occupied West Bank,              
see Fiona Wright’s fascinating analysis in her forthcoming book, ​An Ethics of            
Complicity: Solidarity and Dissent in Jewish Israeli Left Radical Activism ​. Indeed           
Wright argues that solidarity performed in this way entails complicity with the Israeli             
state regime.  
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